



MEMORANDUM FOR:

DD/NFA

  
If you are going to talk to the DCI about NITs, you will be able to put them in perspective if you have in hand also a sample of the PNIOs and the KIQs. There is a remarkable resemblance. Please return.

  
Richard Lehman  
C/NIC

Attachments

Date 9 February 1981

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DCID No. 1/3  
(New Series)

## DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3

## PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 16 May 1968)

## FOREWORD

1. NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3 requires that a Director of Central Intelligence Directive provide "identification from time to time, and on a current basis, of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects," which are to be issued for "general intelligence guidance." The following list is established pursuant to that requirement and replaces that contained in DCID No. 1/3, dated 1 July 1966, which is hereby rescinded.

2. Most of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy is produced in consonance with the Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives similarly prescribed by NSCID No. 1 and contained in DCID No. 1/2. But beyond that general catalogue, which treats most subjects of intelligence interest, NSCID No. 1 requires "the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof." At the same time it is essential to avoid a listing of priorities which is either so voluminous or so general as to encourage a wasteful diffusion of effort.

3. Accordingly, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives are hereby defined as those fundamental questions affecting national survival, which taken together constitute the most critical long-range substantive problems confronting the intelligence community as a whole. These questions are likely to be valid for the next several years, but will be reviewed from time to time on the motion of any member of the United States Intelligence Board. It must be emphasized that the priority assigned to these problems as a whole does not necessarily apply to every aspect of them. Conversely, the fact that a problem is omitted from this list does not necessarily mean that it is not of great importance.


## OBJECTIVES

1. Maximum prior warning of impending military attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is committed to defend. This includes, but is not limited to:

- a. Major changes respecting nuclear weapons and the means for delivery, and strategic defenses; and
- b. Major changes in the strength, organization, and disposition of the general purpose forces of Communist countries.

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2. Maximum prior warning of political or military developments in areas of critical interest to the US, and particularly where US forces are engaged in combat, which carry serious risk of military involvement of the USSR or Communist China.

3. Major changes in the objectives and intentions of the leadership of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

4. Major changes in the strategic military forces of the Soviet Union and of Communist China; capabilities, current and prospective deployment, and intentions with regard to their development and employment.

5. Communist countries' research and development leading to new or significantly improved weapons systems with particular emphasis on strategic offense and defense systems.

6. Changes in international alignments or stability which could seriously damage or materially improve the power position of the US.

RICHARD HELMS  
Director of Central Intelligence